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HOLLYWOOD VS. SILICON VALLEY: DECSS DowN,
NAPSTER TO Go?*
Sarah H. McWane
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Con-
gress that has been assigned the task of defining the
scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted
to authors or to inventors in order to give the public
appropriate access to their work product. Because this
task involves a difficult balance between the interests of
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation
of their writings and discoveries on the one hand, and
society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas,
information, and commerce on the other hand, our
patent and copyright statutes have been amended re-
peatedly.'
Under the authority of Article I, Section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, Congress has continuously
struggled with the task of molding our nation's
copyright laws to adapt to rapid changes in tech-
nology.2 Since Congress passed the first Copyright
Act in 1909, 3 laws have developed in response to
innovations in radio, television and video without
causing fatal damage to their respective industries
* This article was written, and its analysis and conclusions
based on the state of the law just prior to a Feb. 12, 2001
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision. On Feb. 12, a three-
judge Ninth Circuit panel decided that the scope of U.S.
District Court Judge Marilyn Patel's preliminary injunction
was "overbroad" and directed the district court to enter a
modified preliminary injunction. A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., No. 00-16401/403, 2001 WL 115033, at *24
(9th Cir. Feb. 12, 2001). Although Napster is permitted to
stay in business until such time, the Ninth Circuit agreed with
the district court that the RIAA presented a prima facie case
that Napster users committed direct copyright infringement.
Id. at *8. However, Napster may also be held liable for
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, an issue
to be more thoroughly developed at a full trial on the merits
of the case. Id. at *13.
1 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984) (discussing the factors Congress must con-
sider when enacting copyright laws). Congress must consider
whether the legislation stimulates the producer so as to bene-
fit the public and then determine whether the interest in the
temporary monopoly would be outweighed by any benefit
conferred on the public. Id. at 429 n.10.
2 Id. at 428; U.S. CONST. art.1, § 8, cl. 8 (providing in part
that "Congress shall have the Power... To Promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
or markets. 4 Businesses, although hesitant, have
revamped long-standing business models in order
to remain competitive. 5 However, no enterprise
has felt more threatened by technological ad-
vances than the entertainment industry.6 The mu-
sic and film industries both have been reluctant to
embrace new modes of distributing entertain-
ment content.7 The recurring result has been for
these industries to bring numerous lawsuits in the
name of copyright protection trying to quell
emerging technology.8 Digitization of copyrighted
music and movies, the introduction of the In-
ternet and the increasing popularity of peer-to-
peer file sharing over the World Wide Web are no
exception. 9 The ease with which Internet users
can copy and download digital files has put both
the Motion Picture Association of America
respective Writings and Discoveries").
3 Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current ver-
sion codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803 (1994 & Supp. V
1999)).
4 Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Tuning In: The Future of Copy-
right Protection for Online Music in the Digital Millennium, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 2445 (2000) [hereinafter Pollack].
5 Michael S. Malone, Let the Pirates Go, SILICON INSIDER, at
http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/business/SiliconIn-
sider/SiliconInsider_- 000627.html Uune 27, 2000) (discuss-
ing the development and illegal uses of the cable television
industry, and the inevitability of a digital black market).
6 James Lardner, The Empire Strikes Back To Fight Pirates,
the Entertainment Biz Deploys Technology as Well as Lawyers, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 18, 2000, at 56, available at http://
www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/00918/digital.html [herein-
after Lardner] (discussing the entertainment industries
"ongoing legal war against pirates and freeloaders").
7 Charles L. Simmons, Jr., Digital Distribution of Entertain-
ment Content ... The Battle Lines are Drawn, 33 Mo. B.J. 32
(2000) [hereinafter Simmons].
8 See Fred Moody, Online Music Swapping Rocks: Tuning in
to the Techno Beat, at http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/
tech/FredMoody/moody.html (Sept. 2, 2000) (discussing
the reluctance of the music industry to embrace technology
due to greed).
9 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2445.
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("MPAA") I0 and the Recording Industry of Associ-
ation of America ("RAA") I I at risk of potentially
losing billions of dollars to hackers and pirates
over the distribution of digital content.' 2 On the
other hand, websites and Internet Service Provid-
ers ("ISPs")1 3 that facilitate the distribution and
downloading of music and videos over the In-
ternet find themselves in the gray areas of copy-
right law. 14 The ultimate effect of the threat of
copyright lawsuits could stifle rising online ven-
tures. 1
5
Congress, in response to such tensions, passed
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
("DMCA") 16 "to insure that copyrighted content
would continue to be protected by copyright law
in the digital environment, but also sought the
flexibility necessary to allow ... Internet techno-
log[ies] and businesses to flourish while making
copyright content available."' 7 The MPAA and the
RLAA have recently tested the limits of the DMCA
in two groundbreaking cases. The MPAA chal-
lenged the unauthorized copying and distribution
of copyrighted movies on digital versatile disks
("DVD") over the Internet, and the RIAA con-
tested the unauthorized downloading of com-
pressed music files known as MP3s. i8 The poten-
tial piracy problems result from the fact that CDs
and MP3 files do not presently contain encryption
technology to protect against the unauthorized
copying of music content.' 9 While DVDs do con-
10 The eight major motion picture corporations in the
association include Universal City Studios, Inc., Paramount
Pictures Corp., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., Tristar
Pictures Inc., Columbia Pictures, Inc., Time Warner, Co.,
L.P., Disney Enterprises, Inc. and Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. Simmons, supra note 7, at 32.
'' The main members of the RIAA that control 92% of
all music sold in the United States include, UMG Recordings,
Inc., Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., Warner Bros. Records,
Inc., Arista Records, Inc., Atlantic Recording Corp., BMG d/
b/a The RCA Records Label, Capital Records, Inc., Elektra
Entertainment Group, Inc., Interscope Records and Sire
Records Group, Inc. Id.
12 Benton J. Gaffney, Copyright Statutes that Regulate Tech-
nology: A Comparative Analysis of The Audio Home Recording Act
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 75 WASH. L. Ri, v. 611,
629 (2000) [hereinafter Gaffney] (arguing that "the ease of
copying and distributing digital works also encourages unau-
thorized sharing of copyrighted works among private individ-
uals").
13 For the purpose of this article Internet Service Pro-
vider shall be referred to as "ISP." An ISP is defined by The
Digital Millennium Copyright Act as "an entity offering the
transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital
online communications, between or among points specified
by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modifi-
tain this technology, hackers have been able to
easily discover the codes that descramble their se-
curity protection and subsequently post the
decryption program on the Internet.20 In Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 2 a federal district
court judge enjoined a hacker website from the
posting and linking of computer code used to
descramble DVD encryption technology protec-
tion. On the other hand, the RJAA has not been
as successful. In A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 22 a circuit court of appeals judge stayed the
injunction ordered by 'the district court that
would have shut down Napster, a company that
facilitates the free transfer of MP3 music record-
ing files over the Internet.23
In looking at the history of our copyright law
and the DMCA, this note will demonstrate that
the district court decisions in both the Reimerdes
and Napster test cases are simply temporary re-
straining walls against the unauthorized copying
and distribution of copyrighted music and film
content over the Internet.24 Once these cases are
decided, the entertainment industry must then
determine whether or not they wish to catch up
with technology and adjust the ways they do busi-
ness. 25 Although the MPAA has a good chance of
succeeding on appeal, the RLAA case is less clear
because of the greater implications of legal peer-
to-peer file swapping and our countries' goal of
fostering revolutionary technologies over the In-
cation to the content of the material as sent or received." 17
U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
14 David Segal, MP3.com Loses Court Ruling, THE WASHING-
TON POST, Sept. 7, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Segal].
15 Id.
16 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 512 and in various sections of Chapter 12 of Title
17 of the U.S.C.).
17 The Future of Digital Music: Is There an Upside to
Downloading? Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong., at
http://www.senate.gov/-judiciary/7112000_ogh.htm (2000)
(testimony of Senator Orin G. Hatch) [hereinafter Hearings].
18 Simmons, supra note 7, at 32.
19 Id. at 33.
20 Id.
21 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
22 Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403, 2000 WL 1055915 (9th
Cir. July 28, 2000).
23 Id.
24 Simmons, supra note 7, at 37.
25 Id.; Kimberly D. Richard, The Music Industry and its Dig-
ital Future: Introducing MP3 Technology, 40 IDEA: J.L. & TECH.
426, 430 (2000) ("Court decisions affecting music distribu-
tion could certainly pave the way for the digital distribution
of videos and movies, among other things, once the technol-
ogy has sufficiently evolved.").
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ternet.26 Regardless of the entertainment indus-
tries' success or failure, it will inevitably be up to
the RIAA and the MPAA to adapt their models of
distributing copyrighted content to work with the
Internet, not against it.
This note examines the copyright debate over
the distribution of digital entertainment content
over the Internet and the recent trend of judicial
decisions that strengthen the law in favor of copy-
right holders. First, this note discusses the repro-
duction of music and video content and the intro-
duction of digital technology. Part II illustrates
the background of copyright law, the theories of
copyright infringement and the fair use affirma-
tive defense to infringement. Part III explores the
ways in which the DMCA has strengthened copy-
right law, and how it effects the entertainment in-
dustry and ISPs. Part IV of this note recounts the
district court's opinion in the Reimerdes case under
Title I of the DMCA and the district court's opin-
ion in the Napster case under Title II of the
DMCA. Part V assesses the district court's decision
to preliminarily enjoin Napster from facilitating
the free transfer of MP3 files over the Internet
and the effect it could have on other file-sharing
technologies. Utilizing the aforementioned dis-
cussions, this note concludes with an analysis of
the implications of the Reimerdes and Napster deci-
sions on the future of copyright law, and the un-
authorized copying and distribution of digital en-
tertainment content in cyberspace.
I. REPRODUCTION OF MUSIC AND VIDEO
CONTENT AND THE INTRODUCTION OF
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
The digitization of music and film content from
its previous analog27 format has revolutionized
26 Hearings, supra note 17 (testimony of Senator Orin G.
Hatch).
27 "Analog" is generally defined as "designating or of
electronic, recordings, etc. in which the signal corresponds
to a physical change, as sound to a groove in a phonograph
record." Elizabeth R. Grosse, Recording Industy Association of
America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.: The RIAA Could
Not Stop the Rio-MP3 Files and The Audio Home Recording Act,
34 U.S.F. L. REv. 575, 577 n.18 (2000) [hereinafter Grosse]
(citing WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 385 (3d. ed.
1994)) (noting that examples of analog recordings include
audio cassette tapes and video cassette tapes).
28 Simmons, supra note 7, at 33.
29 Id.
30 Gaffney, supra note 12, at 630 n.129 (reasoning, how-
the way the entertainment industry distributes
their copyrighted products to consumers. 2 The
digital medium is now the standard for releasing
new and existing content.29 As the unauthorized
reproduction of analog audiocassettes and video-
cassettes posed a threat to the entertainment in-
dustry in the 1980s, the new digital formats create
similar concerns. 30
A. The Sony Betamax Video Tape Recorder
("VTR") and the Emergence of DVDs
The initial threat to the entertainment industry
over the unauthorized copying of video content
arose in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Stu-
dios.31 In Sony, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the sale of the Sony VTR for home taping and
later private viewing of copyrighted television
broadcasts constituted a "fair use."32 Because cop-
yright holders do not posses exclusive rights to
their works; individuals may reproduce copy-
righted works without permission if it is done so
in a fair or reasonable manner. 33 The Court fur-
ther held that "a manufacturer is not liable for the
sale of a 'staple article of commerce' that is 'capa-
ble of commercially significant [or substantial]
noninfringing uses.' "34 Sony is the landmark case
that ultimately laid out what is now known as the
common law fair use and staple article of com-
merce doctrines, both of which are affirmative de-
fenses to copyright infringement imposing the
burden of proof on the defendant infringer. 35
Approximately fifteen years after the Sony deci-
sion, in the mid-1990s, the digitization of video
content from their original videocassette tapes
emerged on the market. 36 The film industry cur-
rently distributes most of their copyrighted mov-
ies in digital format on DVDs, which can be
ever, that just as the movie industry's fears that VCRs would
"eliminate the demand for movies in theaters" proved un-
founded, "it may turn out that fears of digital technology...
may also prove unfounded").
3-1 464 U.S. at 417.
312 Id. at 442.
33 Id.
34 Id.
'5 Ariel Berschadsky, RIAA v. Napster: A Window Onto the
Future of Copyright Law in the Internet Age, 18 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 755, 764 (2000) [hereinafter Berschad-
sky]; see also Pollack, supra note 4, at 2459 (discussing the fair
use affirmative defense to online copyright infringement).
3-6 Simmons, supra note 7, at 32 (discussing digital video
technology).
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played and viewed on home DVD playersA7 and
computer hard drives.38 An encryption-based sys-
tem, known as Content Scrambling System
("CSS"), protects these motion pictures from be-
ing decrypted, and copied or viewed on non-CSS-
licensed DVD players.39 The digital sound and
graphic files that are encrypted on CSS-protected
DVDs can only be decrypted by an "appropriate
decryption algorithm that employs a series of keys
stored on the DVD and DVD players."40 Conse-
quently, only CSS-protected players and drives
containing the appropriate keys can decrypt and
play the secured DVD files.41 Manufacturers of
compliant DVD playing devices are given licenses,
subject to an administrative fee, on a royalty-free
basis. 42 Although DVDs can be copied without
degradation from generation to generation, the
unauthorized copying and distribution of DVDs
tends to pose less of a threat to the film industry
than did the Sony VTR because DVDs do not con-
tain sophisticated compression technology." 3
Thus, the digital transfer of full-length feature
films takes up large amounts of hard drive space,
and copying is less feasible due to huge download
and transfer times. 44
B. Compact Disks ("CDs"), The Digital Audio
Tape ("DAT") and MP3s
Like the film industry, one of the most signifi-
cant advances for the recording industry has been
the digitization of music content.45 The CD was
the first commercially successful digital medium,
providing consumers with a much clearer sound
than the older analog technology.46 Unlike DVDs,
CDs have never been encrypted with technology
37 DVD players are the functional equivalent to VCRs
that play analog videocassette tapes, but DVD players are
used to play DVDs viewed on television screens. See, e.g.,
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 310.
38 DVDs, also know as CD-ROMs, are five-inch wide opti-
cal disks that can also be read and played on a computer's
five-inch wide CD-ROM drive and viewed on computer
screens. See id. at 307, 310.
39 Id. at 308 (explaining the development of CSS).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Simmons, supra note 7, at 33; see aLo Reimerdes, II1 F.
Supp. 2d at 308.
44 Simmons, supra note 7, at 33.
45 Id. at 32.
46 Id. (discussing that like DVDs, CDs can be copied with-
to protect against the unauthorized copying and
distribution of copyrighted music. 47 Initially, cop-
ying digitally copyrighted music to cassette tapes,
using analog recording devices, produced lower
sound quality that deteriorated after each succes-
sive reproduction. 48 In the early 1980s, a few years
after CDs were introduced, the DAT recorder be-
came commercially available to consumers. 49 The
recording industry was concerned with DAT re-
cordings because, unlike the inferior analog qual-
ity copies, the DAT created perfect copies of copy-
righted music. 5 °1
An even greater threat to copyright protection
in the recording industry is the more recent intro-
duction of the MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3 or MP3.51
MP3 is a digital compression technology that al-
lows audio recordings to be compressed into files
that can easily be downloaded on personal com-
puters or transferred over the Internet. 52 Com-
pressed MP3 files are attractive because, as op-
posed to the transfer of DVDs, they use little
memory, and require little download or transfer
time. 53 As with DVD files transferred over the In-
ternet, MP3 files retain CD-quality sound. 54 Users
can upload CDs to their computers by using "rip-
ping" software, which makes it possible to encode
them into MP3 format and then transfer the files
over the Internet. 55 Users also can quickly
download already compressed MP3 files from the
Internet onto their computer hard drives or
"burn" them onto CDs.56 The problem remains
that a majority of MP3 files were never authorized
by their owners to be available in digital format
over the Internet.57 Like CDs, MP3s do not con-
tain copyright management information. Thus,
there is no protection from the free unauthorized
out degradation from each generation).
47 Id. at 33.
48 Grosse, supra note 27, at 578 (discussing digital and
analog recording devices).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 578-79.
51 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2449.
52 Id. (discussing MP3 technology).
53 Id. at 2450.
54 Id. at 2449.
55 A&M Recordings, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d
896, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing MP3 technology).
56 See id. "Burning" refers to the process by which music
files from a computer hard drive are encoded onto CDs. See
id.
57 Grosse, supra note 27, at 581 (discussing the piracy
problem).
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use, copying or distribution of the recordings. 58
Despite its enormous potential for copyright in-
fringement, the MP3 format is quickly becoming
the standard for the digital distribution of mu-
sic.59
C. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992
("AHRA") 60 and the Diamond Multimedia61
Decision
With the advent of DVDs and MP3s, the en-
tertainment industry felt threatened by these new
methods by which people could make perfect
copies of video and music recordings. 62 In Octo-
ber 1992, reacting to the Sony decision and the ar-
rival of the DAT recorder in the home consumer
market, Congress enacted the AHRA.653 The
AHRA was designed to protect consumers from
copyright infringement liability for private, non-
commercial taping of copyrighted audio or video
recordings while at the same time also protecting
copyright owners from piracy.64 The AHRA ac-
complishes this goal by requiring anyone who
manufactures, imports or distributes a digital re-
cording device to pay a royalty that goes into a
general fund that is distributed to copyright own-
ers to make up for lost revenues. 65 Such recording
devices also are required to implement a Serial
Copyright Management System ("SCMS"), an en-
coding technology that prevents the device's abil-
ity to create copies of any works it records (i.e.,
making copies of a copy). 66
The AHRA was tested in June 1999 when the
RAA sued to enjoin Diamond Multimedia Sys-
tems, Inc. from manufacturing and distributing its
Rio Player in Recording Industry Ass'n of America v.
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. 67 The Rio player al-
lows users to download MP3 files from a computer
hard drive and store them on a memory card.68
58 Id. at 582.
59 Simmons, supra note 7, at 33.
60 Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1992)).
61 Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Mul-
timedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
62 RebeccaJ. Hill, Pirates of the 21" Century: The Threat and
Promise of Digital Audio Technology on the Internet, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 311, 324-25 (2000)
[hereinafter Hill].
63 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010; see also Hill, supra note 62, at
324-25.
64 Grosse, supra note 27, at 580 (discussing the layout of
the AHRA).
65 Id.
The files on the memory card can then be stored
on a portable device, and played and listened to
using headphones. 69 In this case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that the AHRA did not
cover the Rio player and that personal computers
and MP3 files were exempted from regulation
under the AHRA. 70 The court further found that
the Rio did not qualify as a "digital audio record-
ing device" because it only downloads MP3 files
from computer hard drives, and a hard drive is
neither a "digital music recording" nor a transmis-
sion thereof.7 Thus, Rio players were not capable
of creating "digital audio copied recording[s]"
within the meaning of the AHRA.72 The Diamond
Multimedia suit was ultimately settled out of court
on undisclosed terms. 73 Yet, even if the Ninth Cir-
cuit had found that the AHRA applied to the Rio,
because MP3 files do not contain copyright man-
agement information, SCMS would have done lit-
tle to stop the unauthorized copying of music re-
cordings.74
As a result of the challenges of digital technol-
ogy, the Secure Digital Music Initiative ("SDMI")
forum was launched in December of 1998 "to
bring together interested parties to develop tech-
nology specifications for protecting the distribu-
tion of digital media. '75 The forum's goal was to
create a single standard and clear rules for devel-
oping secure copyright technology that would be
incorporated into new digital playback devices
and programs. 76 The first phase of SDMI, set to
come out no earlier than the end of 2000, covers
both the sale and manufacturing of SDMI-compli-
ant portable digital music players, which also
would be allowed to play unencrypted, non-SDMI-
compliant, files. 77 The second phase of SDMI con-
sists of issuing encryption technology and
watermarking 78 of SDMI-compliant music that
can only be played or copied on SDMI-compliant
66 Id.
67 180 F.3d at 1073.
68 Grosse, supra note 27, at 581 (describing Rio technol-
ogy and how it works).
6;9 Id.
70 Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1081.
7' Id. at 1076-78
72 Grosse, supra note 27, at 586.
73 Simmons, supra note 7, at 34.
74 Grosse, supra note 27, at 597.
75 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 926 n.31.
76 Grosse, supra note 27, at 597-98 (discussing the solu-
tions to the MP3 piracy problem).
77 Id.; see also Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 926 n.31.
78 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 926 n.31 ("Watermarking
20011
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devices. 79 Although encryption technology will
not affect existing CDs and MP3 files, encrypted
CDs and digital files will not work on existing CD
or software players.80 Consumers will either have
to purchase new SDMI-compliant CD players or
upgrade their computer software in order to lis-
ten to, copy or download encrypted music."' The
strictness with which SDMI presents to consumers
in their ability to gain access to copyrighted music
demands a look back at the original purpose of
our copyright laws.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW THAT AFFECTS THE
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY AND ISPS
IN CYBERSPACE
A. The Background of the United States
Copyright Law
The need for copyright protection first
emerged in the colonial period as a response to
British censorship laws and the invention of the
printing press.8 2 Since the earliest days of our na-
tion, copyright law has sought to balance the need
for freedom of expression with the desire to en-
courage technological improvements.8 3 Today,
the Copyright Act of 197684 (the "Copyright Act"
or the "1976 Copyright Act") states that
"[ciopyright protection subsists . . . in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, now known or later developed. '" 8 5
Generally, film and music copyrights are shared
between joint authors consisting of the actual mu-
sical artist or actor herself, and the music or film
producers.8 6 Recording artists and RLAA members
are compensated for their creative work from the
imbeds 'bits' or inaudible marks on content media; future
SDMI-compliant devices or software players will be able to
read the presence or absence of those bits and control copy-
ing accordingly.")
79 Grosse, supra note 27, at 598.
80 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 926 n.31.
81 Id.
82 Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.12.
83 Id.
84 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541-26012 (codified at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
85 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994 & Stipp. V 1999).
86 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2453.
87 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 762.
88 John Jackson, Royalty Securitization: Taking Cabs to Bank-
ruptcy Court, 21 T.JEFFERSON L. REV. 209, 212 (2000) (discuss-
ing the cash flow assets that are available in the entertain-
ment industry).
89 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 762; see also Naomi Abe
sale of phone records and license fees.8 7 In the
case of actors and the MPAA, compensation
comes from the sale and rental of videos, movie
ticket sales and license fees.88 Profits from the
sale, distribution and reproduction of the works
are the primary motivating factor for artists to
make worthwhile their initial monetary and artis-
tic investments in their respective industries.8 9
B. Traditional Theories of Copyright
Infringement: Direct, Contributory and
Vicarious Liability
Under the 1976 Copyright Act, copyright hold-
ers are granted exclusive rights and are author-
ized to reproduce, prepare derivative works, dis-
tribute copies, display and perform copyrighted
work publicly. 90 Copyright infringement occurs if
any of these exclusive rights are violated.9 '
1. Direct Copyright Liability
A direct copyright infringer can be held directly
liable for actual physical infringement of a copy-
right holder's works. 92 Direct infringement occurs
if the copyright owner can prove: "(1) valid copy-
right ownership of a work; (2) the work was, in
fact, copied; and (3) the copying of work was ille-
gal under copyright laws." 93 The direct infringer's
intent or knowledge is not an element that needs
to be proven under the Copyright Act.94 A copy-
right owner can obtain both monetary damages
and injunctive relief as a result of the infringer's
absolute liability.95
In UMG Recordings. v. MP3.com, Inc.,96 the de-
Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213,
1241 (1997) [hereinafter Voegtli] (discussing the incentive
factors that drive the entertainment industry).
90 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 764 (outlining the
framework of the Copyright Act); 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999).
91 Jennifer E. Markiewicz, Comment, Seeking Shelter from
the MP3 Storm: How Far Does the Digital Millenium Copyright Act
Online Service Provider Liability Limitation Reach?, 7 COMMLAw
CONSPECTUS 423, 426 (1999) [hereinafter Markiewicz].
92 Id. at 426.
93 Id. at 427 (citing MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING
COPYRiGHT L, \w § 9.20 (2d ed. 1995)).
94 i.
95 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 764.
96 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing direct
liability as applied to online copyright infringement). The
RIAA filed the lawsuit against MP3.com on behalf of Univer-
sal Music Group and four other major RlAA members. While
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fendant MP3.com faces the largest fine ever im-
posed in a direct copyright infringement case if
not overturned on appeal. 97 In that case,
MP3.com purchased and copied thousands of
plaintiff RIAA's CDs and stored them on its serv-
ers. 98  Part of MP3.com's service, called
"My.MP3.Com," allowed users to log on and once
they "proved"99 that they owned an original copy
of a recording in the defendant's database, the
user could access the music over the Internet
from any computer without having to insert the
original disk.0 1 The district court judge found
that defendant MP3.com's "replaying for the sub-
scribers converted versions of the recordings it
copied, without authorization from plaintiff's
copyrighted CDs," was a presumptive case for di-
rect liability under the Copyright Act.'0 1 The
judge later ruled that MP3.com "willfully" violated
copyright law and ordered defendant to pay
$25,000 per CD to RIAA for a total penalty of
roughly $118 million.' 02 The primary purpose of
the lawsuit was to send a very poignant message to
other music-sharing Internet services tempted to
break copyright law by offering free copies of
copyrighted works over the Internet. 0 3
2. Contributory and Vicarious Copyright Liability
Third parties, such as ISPs, who do not actually
commit copyright infringement themselves can be
held indirectly liable for the copyright infringe-
ment of their users through theories of contribu-
tory or vicarious liability. 1 4 Although these theo-
ries of liability for copyright infringement are not
the other four labels settled out of court for an undisclosed
amount, Universal remained the sole plaintiff in the litiga-
tion. See Segal, supra note 14, at Al.
97 See Segal, supra note 14, at Al.
98 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
99 A subscriber can " 'prove' that he already owns the CD
version of the recording by inserting his copy of the commer-
cial CD into his computer CD-ROM drive for a few
seconds . . . or [the subscriber] must purchase the CD from
one of defendant's cooperating online retailers." MP3.com,
92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
100 Segal, supra note 14, at Al.
101 MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
102 UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 472
(JSR), 2000 WL 1262568, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000)
(holding that the statutory damage award could be "more or
less depending on the number of qualifying CDs determined
at the final phase of the trial" and merely relied on defend-
ants approximation of 4,700 CDs copied of plaintiff's copy-
righted works).
103 Id.
addressed in the Copyright Act, courts have long
recognized the need for contributory and vicari-
ous copyright infringement liability. 1115 In order to
prevail on either of these two theories, a copyright
holder must first prove direct copyright infringe-
ment by a third party.'0 6 Defendants can be held
liable for contributory copyright infringement if
the copyright owner proves that: "(1) a direct in-
fringement occurred[;] (2) the defendant knew
or had reason to know of the infringing activity[;]
and (3) the defendant substantially participated
in the infringement by inducing, causing, or ma-
terially contributing to its occurrence."' 0 7 A de-
fendant also can be held vicariously liable even if
he or she has no direct knowledge of the infring-
ing activity.'0 The plaintiff need only prove that
the defendant has "the right and ability to super-
vise the infringing activity and also has a direct fi-
nancial interest in such activities."' 0 9 Both mone-
tary damages and injunctive relief may be sought
for contributory and vicarious theories of liabil-
ity. 110
C. Affirmative Defense of Fair Use
The Sony fair use doctrine is now codified in
Section 107 of the Copyright Act' and provides
the following nonexclusive factors considered in
deciding a copyright infringement case:" 12
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
104 Markiewicz, supra note 91, at 427.
105 Id. (discussing theories of contributory and vicarious
liability).
106 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 911.
107 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2456.
108 Id.
109 E.g., Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259,
262 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding swap meet operator vicariously
liable for the activities of vendors who sold copyrighted mu-
sic recordings). The operators were held vicariously liable be-
cause they had the right to terminate the vendors at will, and
they had a financial interest based on swap meet admission
fees and concession stand sales generated from swap meet
customers. Id.
1 10 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 765-66.
111 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
112 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2459 (laying out the frame-
work for the fair use defense). Recall that this doctrine allows
individuals to reproduce copyrighted works without permis-
sion if it is done so in a fair or reasonable manner. See Sony,
464 U.S. at 442.
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(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work. 1"3
The fair use affirmative defense is applied flexi-
bly on a case-by-case basis. 1 1 4 All of the factors are
considered together in deciding whether a defen-
dant violated copyright law.' 15 Generally, the doc-
trine allows a third party to copy or use a copy-
righted work without the consent of the owner if
it is done in a fair or reasonable manner.' 16
III. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM
COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Background
Before the DMCA was enacted in 1998, ISPs
were sued frequently for contributory infringe-
ment based on the direct copyright infringement
of their users due to the difficulty of identifying
single copyright infringers.' 17 In December 1996,
two treaties were adopted from the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization ("WIPO") confer-
ences held in Geneva, the WIPO Copyright
Treaty", and the WIPO Performances and Pho-
nograms Treaty.' '1, These treaties were designed
to provide contracting nations, including the
United States, with effective legal protection for
authors of copyrighted works from digital piracy
over the Internet. 120 As a result of the WIPO, Con-
gress enacted the DMCA. 12 1 Title I of the DMCA
implements the two WIPO treaties and prevents
the circumvention of technological measures pro-
tecting copyrighted works.1 22 Title II of the
DMCA, or the Online Copyright Infringement Li-
ability Limitation Act, creates a safe harbor and
limits liability for ISPs from the unauthorized cop-
yright infringement by their users.' 2 3
''11 17 U.S.C. § 107 [hereinafter fair use factors].
114 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2459.
115 Id.
116 Hill, supra note 62, at 323.
117 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2456.
118 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright
Treaty, Dec. 20,,1996, 36 I.L.M. 65.
119 World Intellectual Property Organization Perform-
ances and Phonograns Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76.
120 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 315-16 (discussing the
background of the DMCA).
121 Id.
122 17 U.S.C. § 1201-1205 (Supp. IV 1998).
123 Online Copyright Infringement Liability Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 (Supp. IV 1998)).
B. Title I of the DMCA
Title I of the DMCA adds a new Chapter 12 to
Title 17 of the U.S. Code.124 Section 1201 of the
Copyright Act is known as the anti-circumvention
provision. 2 5 Section 1201 (a)(1) prohibits the act
of circumventing a technological protection mea-
sure that controls access to a digital copyrighted
work.' 26 Section 1201(a)(2) prohibits "creating
and making available certain technologies ... de-
veloped or advertised to defeat technological pro-
tections against unauthorized access to a work."12
7
This section further provides that "no person shall
manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide,
or otherwise traffic in any technology"' 2 8 that (1)
is designed primarily to circumvent technology
that protects copyrighted works, (2) has limited
commercially significant uses other than circum-
vention, or (3) is purposely marketed for circum-
vention. 29 The exceptions to this section apply to
reverse engineering, encryption research, protec-
tion of personal identifying information, security
testing, certain analog devices and other govern-
ment activities, as well as to use by educational in-
stitutions and law enforcement.'3 1
C. Title II of the DMCA: The Online
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation
Act
In 1998, Congress added Section 512 to Title 17
of the U.S. Code and incorporated it as Title II of
the DMCA, or The Online Copyright Infringe-
ment Liability Limitation Act of the DMCA.' 3' Ti-
tle II creates a safe harbor and limits the liability
of ISPs from copyright infringement that may pass
124 Brian Socolow and James R. Guerette, Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act Interpreted, N.Y. LJ., July 24, 2000, at s7
(colA) [hereinafter Socolow] (discussing the framework of
Title I of the DMCA); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
125 Socolow, supra note 124; 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
126 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (A) (Supp. IV 1998). This sec-
tion prohibits "actual" circumvention and takes effect Oct.
28, 2000. See Pollack, supra note 4, at 2464.
127 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 316 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 105-551(1), at 18 (1998)); 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
128 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
129 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2463 (discussing the Title I
anti-circumvention provision); see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2)
(A)-(C).
130 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(k).
',1l 17 U.S.C. § 512.
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through their networks. 132 Title II targets actual
Internet users who violate copyright law by either
downloading or uploading the infringing material
without an artist's permission. 133 Under this title
of the DMCA, an ISP can avoid being shut down
by court order for copyright infringement and
can escape liability for money damages even if
they are found vicariously or contributorily liable
for copyright infringement.' 3 However, individ-
ual subscribers who commit infringing activity can
be restrained by court order from accessing the
service provider. 135
The safe harbor provision of Title II limits the
liability of an ISP in four distinct situations. 136
First, Section 512(a) on transitory digital network
communications, applies to a service provider
"transmitting, routing, or providing connections,
for material through a system or network con-
trolled or operated by or for the service provider,
or by reason of the intermediate and transient
storage of that material in the course of such
transmitting, routing, or providing connec-
tions[.]' 1 37 A qualifying ISP under this section
must meet five additional conditions.'3 1 Essen-
tially, under this section, an ISP must be merely a
passive data "conduit" for the infringing material
being transferred through the ISP's network. 13 9
The second limitation on liability, found in Sec-
tion 512(b), applies to system caching. 140 This sec-
tion applies to intermediate or temporary storage
of Internet material on an ISP's server that may be
infringing.' 4 1 In order for an ISP to avail itself of
this safe harbor found in Section 512(b), the ISP
must not select, modify or otherwise interfere
with the information being stored temporarily on
its servers by a copyright infringer. 142
132 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 767.
133 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2466.
134 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 767.
135 17 U.S.C § 512(j) (B) (i).
136 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2465 (laying out the frame-
work for the Title II safe harbor provision).
137 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
138 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1)-(5). Section 512(a) applies if:
(1) the transmission of the material was initiated by or
at the direction of a person other than the service
provider;
(2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections,
or storage is carried out through an automatic tech-
nical process without selection of the material by
the service provider;
(3) the service provider does not select the recipients of
the material except as an automatic response to the
request of another person;
(4) no copy of the material made by the service pro-
The third safe harbor provision, Section 512(c),
limits the liability of an ISP for information resid-
ing on systems or networks at the direction of
users.' 43 This section applies as long as the ISP
does not have actual knowledge of or is aware of
facts and circumstances of the infringing activity,
and does not benefit financially from storing in-
fringing material on its system or network. 144
Once an ISP is made aware of a user's alleged
copyright infringement, the ISP must act "expedi-
tiously to remove or disable access to [ ] the mate-
rial that is claimed to be infringing."'145 The last
section pertaining to ISP copyright liability, Sec-
tion 512(d), applies to information location
tools. 14 6 As long as the same conditions found in
512(c) are met, an ISP will not be held liable
under Section 512(d) for money damages or for
injunctive sanctions for referring or linking to In-
ternet locations that contain infringing material
by way of hyperlinks, online directories, search en-
gines or any other information location tools. 1 47
An important part of Title II is Section 512(n),
which states that subsections (a) and (b) describe
separate and distinct functions, and that the ques-
tion of whether an ISP qualifies for a limitation on
liability is based solely on the criteria of those sub-
sections and does not affect an ISP's potential lia-
bility under another subsection of the DMCA. 148
Finally, in order for an ISP to avail itself of the
safe harbor provisions of Section 512, an ISP must
"adopt and reasonably implement a policy that
provides for the termination of repeat infringers
from the system or network[,] and that accommo-
dates and does not interfere with standard copy-
right protection measures in connection with its
system or network."' 49 The ISP must also register
vider in the course of such intermediate or transient
storage is maintained on the system or network in a
manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than
anticipated recipients ... ; and
(5) the material is transmitted through the system or
network without modification of its content.
Id.
139 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2465.
140 17 U.S.C. § 512(b).
'41 Pollack, supra note 4, at 2465.
142 Id.
14-3 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
144 Id. at § 512(c).
145 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
146 17 U.S.C. § 512(d).
147 Id. at § 512(d); see also Pollack, supra note 4, at 2466.
148 17 U.S.C. § 512(n).
149 Socolow, supra note 124, at s7; see 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
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a designated agent with the U.S. Copyright Office
to receive notifications of claimed copyright in-
fringement by individual users. 151 If an ISP does
not meet the safe harbor provision of Title II of
the DMCA, a court may issue a preliminary in-
junction if the complaining party can show proba-
ble success on the merits and the possibility of ir-
reparable harm, or that the financial burden to
the ISP is outweighed by the harm imposed on
the copyright holder if no action is taken.' 5'
IV. THE MPAA AND RIAA PUT THE DMCA
TO THE TEST
A. Title I of the DMCA: The Background of
Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes
In September 1999, a 15-year-old Norwegian
named Jon Lech Johansen and two unnamed in-
dividuals he met over the Internet produced
DeCSS, a program capable of descrambling CSS
or "decrypting" DVD encryption codes.' 52 He
claimed that he created DeCSS, a Windows exe-
cutable file, in order to use DVDs on his Linux-
based system, which did not support DVDs at the
time.' 53 Johansen then posted on his personal
website the DeCSS executable code, allowing non-
licensed computers to play complete movie files
and to copy decrypted files onto computer hard
drives.' 54 In November 1999, the defendants in
Reimerdes, 2600 Enterprises and owner Eric Cor-
ley, publisher of "The Hacker Quarterly," posted
the DeCSS source and object code on their web-
site, 2600.com.' 55 At this website, users could
download DeCSS software directly or they could
link to other websites that posted DeCSS in order
to unscramble the CSS protection code. 156 In Oc-
tober 1999, the MPAA became aware of the post-
15o Socolow, supra note 124, at s7.
15' Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 911; see also Berschadsky,
supra note 35, at 767.
152 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (noting that Norwe-
gian prosecutors filed an action against Johansen in Jan.
1999 as a result of his creation of DeCSS).
'53 P.J. Connolly, Enterprise Toolbox: 'The Sharing' Debate:
When Source Code is Outlawed, Only Outlaws Will Have the Source
Code, INFOWORLD, Sept. 4, 2000, available at 2000 WL
20918043 [hereinafter Connolly] (discussing new technolo-
gies and the file-sharing debate).
1'4 Id.
155 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308-09 (stating that in
the hacker community, Corley goes by the name of Emman-
uel Goldstein, the underground leader in George Orwell's
classic, 1984).
156 Id. at 311-12; see also id. at 309-10 (detailing how CSS
ing of DeCSS on the Internet and sent websites
with DeCSS posted on them cease and desist let-
ters.' 5 7 Because 2600.com did not comply with
their requests, the MPAA filed a lawsuit against
Coley in January 2000, seeking to enjoin
2600.com from posting and later from the "elec-
tronic civil disobedience" of linking to other web-
sites that posted DeCSS technology on them. 158
1. The Parties' Contentions
In the Reimerdes case, the MPAA argued that de-
fendant 2600.com's posting of DeCSS and linking
to other websites with DeCSS violated Section
1201 (a) (2) of the DMCA, the copyright anti-cir-
cumvention provision.1 59 They stressed that in or-
der for copyright holders to "make their works
available in digital form without the threat of
piracy," the DMCA technological circumvention
restrictions should be enforced.1 60 The defend-
ants argued that posting and linking to DeCSS
was fair use within the meaning of the Copyright
Act. 161 They also asserted a First Amendment
claim, arguing that the DMCA violated freedom
of speech as it applied to computer programs or
code. 162
2. The District Court's Opinion Finding DeCSS a
Clear Violation of Title I of the DMCA
Judge Kaplan for the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York held in Reimerdes
that defendant 2600.com's posting and linking of
DeCSS computer code was a clear violation of the
DMCA, and that plaintiff MPAA was entitled to
both injunctive and monetary relief.' 63
protects motion pictures from being decrypted and copied,
or viewed on non-CSS-licensed DVD players or hard drives).
157 Id. at 312.
158 Id. The initial lawsuit was filed against Corley and two
other defendants who later entered into consent agreements
with the plaintiffs. 2600.com was subsequently added as a de-
fendant in an amended complaint. See id. at 312 n.91.
'59 Eric J. Sinrod, Judge Rules Against DeCSS Download, UP-
sIDE TODAY, Aug. 29, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4725619
[hereinafter Sinrod] (discussing the competing arguments
set forth in the Reimerdes case); 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
160 Sinrod, supra note 159; 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2).
161 Id.; see also Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 321-22.
162 Sinrod, supra note 159; see also Reinerdes, 111 F. Supp.
2d at 325-26.
"I" Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 346.
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a. Posting and Linking to DeCSS Violates Anti-
circumvention Provision
The court first found that DeCSS "clearly is a
means of circumventing a technological access
control measure.' 64 Furthermore, the court
ruled that if CSS fell within subsections (A), (B)
or (C) of Section 1201(a)(2) of the DMCA and
none of the statutory exceptions applied to
2600.com, defendant's posting of DeCSS violated
the DMCA.1 65 Second, the court found that CSS
effectively controls access to plaintiffs copyrighted
DVDs and falls within Section 1201 (a) (2) (A) be-
cause "in the ordinary course of its operation,
[the measure] requires the application of infor-
mation, or a process or a treatment, with the au-
thority of the copyright owner, to gain access to
the work."'166 Third, because the sole purpose for
creating DeCSS was to decrypt CSS, DeCSS was
designed primarily to circumvent CSS.167 Thus, by
posting DeCSS on 2600.com, the court held that
the defendants distinctly violated Section
1201 (a) (2) (A) of the DMCA. Under the same
analysis, the court concluded that the defendants
also had violated Section 1202(a) (2) (B) because
the primary purpose or use of DeCSS was to cir-
cumvent CSS.168
The defendants argued that DeCSS fell within
the reverse engineering, encryption research and
security testing exceptions to circumvention of
technological measures under Section 1201 (a) of
the DMCA. 169 Defendants argued that the reverse
engineering exception in the DMCA applied be-
cause "DeCSS is necessary to achieve interoper-
ability between computers running the Linux op-
164 Id.
165 Id. at 319; 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2)(A)-(C).
166 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
167 Id. at 318-19; 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2) (A).
168 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318; see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (a) (2) (B).
169 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319-21; 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (f), (g) (4), and (j).
170 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
171 Id.
172 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f); id. at § 1201(f)(3) (providing
that one who reverse engineers information may make the
information "available to others, if the person ... provides
such information solely for the purpose of enabling inter-
operability of an independently created computer program
with other programs, and to the extent that doing so does
not constitute infringement").
173 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 320 (finding that the
"right to make information available extends only to dissemi-
nation 'solely for the purpose' of achieving interoperability
as defined in the statute").
eration system and DVDs.' 1 70 In rejecting this
argument, Judge Kaplan stated that the reverse
engineering exception applied only to those who
actually acquired the information that they later
reverse engineered. 17 1 Thus, this exception was
inapplicable to defendants because they did not
create DeCSS but merely posted it afterJohansen
had created it.172 Although one of the purposes
for Johansen's developing DeCSS was to build a
Linux DVD player, Judge Kaplan found that it was
not the sole purpose, as required by the reverse
engineering exception, because DeCSS was devel-
oped on Windows, a more widely used operating
system.' 73 Judge Kaplan rejected defendant's ar-
gument in applying the encryption research ex-
ception because they posted DeCSS on the In-
ternet and were not engaged in "good faith
encryption research.' 7 4 Lastly, the judge rejected
the defendants' security testing argument because
posting DeCSS had nothing to do with testing
computers within the meaning of that subsection
of the DMCA.1 75
On the issue of linking to other websites post-
ing DeCSS, the court held in Reimerdes that
2600.com's linking constituted an "offering to the
public, provid[ing], or otherwise traffic[king]" in
DeCSS, violating the plain meaning of Section
1201(a)(2) of the DMCA. 17 6 Because the
2600.com "linked to sites that automatically com-
mence the process of downloading DeCSS upon a
user being transferred to [their] hyperlinks," de-
fendants engaged in the "functional equivalent of
transferring the DeCSS code to the user them-
174 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (g)(2)(A)-(D). Circumvention of
technological measures is permitted in the course of good
faith encryption if:
(A) the person lawfully obtained the encrypted copy,
phonorecord, performance, or display of the pub-
lished work;
(B) such act is necessary to conduct such encryption re-
search;
(C) the person made a good faith effort to obtain au-
thorization before the circumvention; and
(D) such act does not constitute infringement under
this title.
Id.
175 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j). The security testing provision ap-
plies when, "accessing a computer, computer system, or com-
puter network, solely for the purpose of good faith testing,
investigation, or correcting, a security flaw or vulnerability,
with the authorization of the owner or operator of such com-
puter." Id.
176 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 324; 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (a) (2) (A).
2001]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
selves."' 177 However, the court limited future link-
ing liability to parties who know that infringing
material is contained on the linked site, know that
the circumvention technology may not be offered
lawfully or use the "link for the purpose of dissem-
inating that technology." 178
b. Fair Use Defense Rejected
Judge Kaplan found the defendant's fair use ar-
gument without merit in Reimerdes. The judge rea-
soned that defendants had not been sued for cop-
yright infringement but for circumvention of
technological measures that effectively control ac-
cess to a copyrighted work, to which Congress
never intended fair use to apply under the Copy-
right Act. 179 First, the court noted that the fair use
defense to copyright infringement would be appli-
cable only provided that the copyright holder au-
thorized access to a copy of the copyrighted
work.'8 0 Second, Congress had delayed the effec-
tive date of Section 1201(a)(1) for two years
pending an investigation of how circumvention
could be reconciled with fair use concerns under
the DMCA." 1' Third, Congress already had cre-
ated certain exceptions to Section 1201(a) analo-
gous to fair use, such as reverse engineering, en-
cryption research and security testing. 8 2 Lastly,
the court noted that Congress never meant for
Section 1201 to incorporate Sony and its explica-
tion of fair use.'
c. The First Amendment: Computer Code Is Not
Pure Speech
The defendants argued that computer code is
speech, which is entitled to strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment and thus is exempt from
government regulation like the DMCA.84 In re-
sponse to this argument, Judge Kaplan stated that
177 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
178 Id. at 341; see also Sinrod, supra note 159, at *2 (dis-
cussing future linking liability under the DMCA).
179 Reimerdes, III F. Supp. 2d at 322.
180 Id. See generally Sinrod, supra note 159, at *2 (discuss-
ing the fair use defense used in Reimerdes).
181 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 324.
184 Id. at 304 (summarizing the defendants' position in
the Reimerdes opinion).
185 Id.
186 Id; see also Mark Hamblett, Movie Studios Score )VD Vic-
tory, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 18, 2000, at I (Col. 3) [hereinafter Ham-
"[c]omputer code is expressive. To that extent, it
is a matter of First Amendment concern. But com-
puter code is not purely expressive any more than
the assassination of a political figure is purely a
political statement."'18 5 The "expressive element"
of code "no more immunizes its functional as-
pects from regulation than the expressive motives
of an assassin immunize the assassin's actions." 186
The court also noted that DeCSS is computer
code, which like the transmission of a computer
virus, has the ability to disable our nation's com-
puter networks on which we depend. 187 Regula-
tions of computer code are necessary because
"[t] he Constitution ... is a framework for build-
ing ajust and democratic society ... not a suicide
pact."' 8 8 Congress possesses the power to establish
content-neutral regulations that incidentally ef-
fect expression like computer code. 189 Thus the
DMCA, as applied to the posting and linking of
DeCSS, did not contravene the First Amendment.
3. Analysis of the District Court's Ruling
Judge Kaplan's ninety-page opinion examining
DeCSS under the DMCA was, for the most part,
an accurate interpretation of that law. Although
his opinion expressed an obvious hostility toward
the defendants in Reimerdes and sympathy for the
copyright holders, his decision will likely be up-
held on appeal on grounds of a clear public pol-
icy against hacking. The facts in Reimerdes also
seem to fit within the provisions of Section 1201
of the DMCA.
However, the opinion raises serious questions.
First, the court held that "CSS effectively controls
access to plaintiffs' copyrighted work" because "in
.the ordinary course of its operation ... [it] 'actu-
ally works' to prevent access to the protected
work."" ° Yet, the fact that the encryption technol-
ogy was broken by a teenager so quickly and is
blett] (discussing Judge Kaplan's First Amendment analysis).
187 Reimerdes, II1 F. Supp. 2d at 304. See generally Sinrod,
supra note 159 (discussing the free speech argument).
188 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
189 Id. at 333. The court limited this holding to:
1) programs that circumvent access controls to copy-
righted works in digital form in circumstances in which,
2) there is no other practical means of preventing in-
fringement through use of the programs[,] and 3) the
regulation is motivated by a desire to prevent perform-
ance of the function for which the programs exist rather
than any message they might convey.
Hamblett, supra note 186.
190 Reimerdes, 11l F. Supp. 2d at 317.
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now widely available over the Internet shows that
CSS does not "actually work." Judge Kaplan ig-
nored the fact that you cannot "unring" a bell and
a judicial decision does not stop the spread of
DeCSS on the Internet. If a technology such as
CSS does not even minimally do its job, it may not
truly be an effective measure. There are no clear-
cut standards for this kind of security protection
technology. Just because a company claims it has a
technology of a certain quality does not mean that
it is fool proof or that those companies are justi-
fied in accusing people of breaking their poor ex-
cuse for a protection measure. A more efficient
solution might have been to warn the MPAA to
recognize CSS' failure and to promote finding a
way to make a more effective control measure.
Second, the court found that Johansen's pri-
mary purpose for developing DeCSS was not to
make a Linux DVD player, and that "[s] ubstantial
questions have been raised both at trial and else-
where as to the veracity of Mr. Johansen's
claim."'191 However, the court never made it clear
why Johansen was not a credible witness. Moreo-
ver, the court did not explain why it was unreason-
able to believe thatJohansen's creation of a Linux
DVD player was not the primary purpose of his
writing DeCSS (if the technology's primary pur-
pose was to circumvent a technological measure,
the defendant will be liable under the DMCA). 192
In order to decrypt files on a Linux machine, Jo-
hansen originally had to encrypt the code on a
Windows computer because a Linux program at
that time did not support the file system for
DVDs.19 3 The judge merely asserted thatJohansen
had knowledge that DeCSS could be used and
copied on computers running Windows, even
though Judge Kaplan never stated why the origi-
nal Linux purpose was only secondary to evading
CSS. 1 9 4
Third, the judge described in great detail the
191 Eric Corley, Analysis of the Decision Against 2600.com,
THE HACKER Q., at http://wwvw.2600.com/news/2000/
0821.html (Aug. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Corley] (analyzing
the district court's decision against 2600.com and challeng-
ingJudge Kaplan's dismissal of Johansen's testimony).
192 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 323-24.
196 Id.
197 Corley, supra note 191.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
legislative history of the DMCA and found that
the Sony fair use defense did not apply to circum-
vention technology, but his analysis is inconsistent
with the statute's purpose of encouraging new
technologies. 195 Judge Kaplan casually noted that
"[a] 11 or substantially all motion pictures available
on DVD are available also on videotape. In conse-
quence, anyone wishing to make lawful use of a
particular movie may buy or rent a videotape, play
it, and even copy all or part of it with readily avail-
able equipment."' 9 6 In essence, he stated that
consumers should use "old technology [not] af-
fected by the DMCA" in order to avail themselves
of the privileges of the long-standing and highly
regarded fair use doctrine. 197
A fourth point is the issue of whether computer
code is speech. The district court clearly went too
far in drawing an analogy between computer code
and a political assassination. 9 A better compari-
son would have been to analogize the instructions
for an assassination to copying a computer pro-
gram, compiling it, and executing it in its proper
setting or platform, as Corley has maintained. 99
This better analogy requires acting on the instruc-
tions in order to complete the task.200 However, it
is likely that computer code will not be afforded
the same level of First Amendment protection as
pure speech. 2600.com may, therefore, be subject
to some level of government regulation.201
The decision in Reimerdes also tried to achieve
the goal of scaring off hackers who have increas-
ingly compromised the computer systems on
which our nation depends. However, in his deci-
sion, Judge Kaplan avoided the defendant's argu-
ment that "an injunction would be futile because
DeCSS is already all over the Internet.'" 20 2 This
question needs to be addressed because of the In-
ternet's pervasiveness and the ease with which
savvy computer users seem to be able to hack ex-
isting computer security codes. Facing the same
201 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969)
(holding that the First Amendment, aimed at protecting and
furthering communications, does not prevent "the Govern-
ment from making radio communications possible by requir-
ing licenses to broadcast and by limiting the number of li-
censes so as not to overcrowd the spectrum"). Thus, because
of the scarcity of radio frequencies and the uniqueness of the
radio medium, the government is allowed to put restraints
on the ability to obtain a broadcasting license. See id. at 390.
In Red Lion, the Supreme Court further found that although
broadcasting is a medium affected by First Amendment inter-
ests, differences in the characteristics of emerging media war-
rant differences in First Amendment standards. Id. at 386.
202 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
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dilemma in the mid-1980s, the software industry
abandoned most forms of digital encryption copy
protection. 20 3 This should not suggest that the
MPAA should abandon its own vigorous efforts
for fear of hacking. However, it seems the more
copyright owners lock up the rights to their mate-
rial, the more rebellious users get in trying to ac-
cess this material. 20 4
A decision preventing linking to DeCSS and im-
posing liability on one website also seems futile
due to the vastness of the Internet. The implica-
tion of a holding that equates linking to the ac-
cepted prohibition against offering pirated copies
of copyrighted material yourself could be danger-
ous to the Internet's future growth.2 0 5 To prove
this point, the 2600.com website currently lists but
does not link to "mirror sites" that post DeCSS.20 6
They also provide a link to the Disney search en-
gine, where users can search for sites that contain
the DeCSS code.2 0 7 The court did not address
some of these potential problems. Judge Kaplan's
decision seemed clearly pro-entertainment indus-
try and, on appeal, consumers will need to hear a
better argument on why the freedom inherent in
these new technologies are increasingly being
taken away by powerful industry groups like the
MPAA. A final interesting note is that in a similar
suit filed in California by the MPAA to stop a web-
site from posting the DeCSS code, the complaint
included an affidavit with a copy of the DeCSS
computer code. 20 This complaint was not filed
under seal initially.209 Approximately two weeks
later, however, the film industry and their attor-
neys did request that it be placed under seal, by
which time several websites had already posted
the DeCSS code as part of the publicly available
affidavit.2 10
203 Hearings, supra note 17 (testimony of Gene Kan,
Gnutella, Developer and Founder, Infrasearch, Inc.) (stating
that encryption technology seldom works, as the encryption
for Microsoft's non-MP3 digital music format, Windows Me-
dia Audio, was broken instantly after its release).
204 Lardner, supra note 6, at 56 (discussing consumer re-
bellion against digitally protected formats).
205 Corley, supra note 191.
206 See generally 2600.com, at http://www.2600.com (last
modified Oct. 18, 2000). "Mirror sites" are sites that
2600.com formerly posted that linked to sites containing
DeCSS code but now are merely listed on the 2600.com web-
site. Id.
207 Id.
208 Simmons, supra note 7, at 14 (citing DVD Copy Con-
trol Assoc., Inc. v. McLaughlin, No. CV 768804, 2000 WL
48512 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000)).
B. RIAA and Title II of the DMCA: A & M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
1. The Parties and Procedural History
On December 6, 1999, almost a year before
Reimerdes, the RIAA filed a suit in the U.S. District
Court for Northern California, against Napster,
Inc.2 1I Napster is a Silicon Valley Internet startup
that facilitates peer-to-peer file sharing, enabling
its users to download MP3 files at no cost.212 The
RIAA members alleged that Napster was liable for
contributory copyright infringement and vicari-
ously liable for the direct copyright infringement
of its users. 213 Napster filed a motion for summary
adjudication under Section 512(a), the safe har-
bor provision of the DMCA, arguing that plaintiffs
were not entitled to monetary damages or injunc-
tive relief except for narrow injunctions against
individual copyright infringers.2 14 The court de-
nied Napster's motion on May 12, 2000, holding
that Napster did not meet the requirements of
Section 512(a) of the DMCA.21 5 In July 2000, the
Senate judiciary committee held a hearing on
"The Future of Digital Music" and heard testi-
mony from key players in both the recording in-
dustry and the digital downloading industry.216
On July 26, 2000, the district court granted
RIAA's motion for a preliminarily injunction
against Napster "engaging in or assisting others in
copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting,
or distributing copyrighted music without the ex-
press permission of the rights owner."2 17 The
court also ordered Napster to comply by July 28,
2000.218 In an eleventh-hour reprieve granted by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 28,
2000, Circuit Judge Kozinski stayed the lower
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 A & M Recordings, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C99-
05183 MHP, 2000 WL 573136, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 12,
2000).
212 Id.
213 [d.
214 [d.
215 Id.
216 The Future of Digital Music: Is There and Upside to
Downloading? Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th
Cong., at http://senate.gov/-judiciary/7112000-ghj.htm.
(2000).
217 A & M Recordings, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp.
2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
218 Id.
[Vol. 9
Copyright Law and the Internet
court's injunction that would have shut down
Napster on that date.219
2. The Development of Napster
Shawn Fanning, a nineteen-year-old college stu-
dent who wanted to facilitate the sharing of MP3
files over the Internet, created and incorporated
Napster in 1999.220 Before Napster, people often
used search engines, like Yahoo, to search for
websites that possibly contained desired MP3 files,
a tedious process that often lead only to "dead
links."221 Fanning envisioned people sharing MP3
files directly from their hard drives with a central-
ized database, "combined with software that con-
verts each user's computer into a server."222 Cur-
rently, users can access the Napster website to
download Napster's proprietary file-sharing
software, MusicShare, free of charge.2 23 Once a
user registers and creates a user name, he or she
logs on and is connected to the database located
on Napster's website. 224 A user can search in real
time for MP3 files offered by other Napster
"hosts" through the Napster database, and also
tell it which files he or she is willing or not willing
to share.2 25 The user can locate a particular artist
or song by simply entering the particular name.
2 26
This information is transmitted to the Napster
network and in return the Napster server sends
the requesting user a list of specific MP3 file
names offered by other hosts.227 Once a user
chooses a file to download, Napster's servers send
a message to the appropriate host, "which as-
sumes the role of server and immediately begins
transferring the file directly to the user through
each party's respective ISP."228 Unlike MP3.com,
Napster does not store any CDs or MP3 files on its
servers. 229 Only the Internet Protocol ("IP") ad-
dresses for each host are stored on Napster's cen-
219 .A & M Recordings, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., Nos.
00-16401 and 00-16403, 2000 WL 1055915, at *1 (9th Cir.
July 28, 2000).
220 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 759.
221 Id. at 759 (discussing the birth of Napster). "Dead
links" are invalid links that a search engine may lead a user to
where the website is either "closed or temporarily off-line."
Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 760.
224 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 905 (discussing Napster
technology).
225 Id.
226 Id. at 906.
227 Id.
tral database, which is updated as hosts log on or
off.2 30
A second aspect of Napster is the "hotlist" func-
tion, which permits users to access and browse
other hosts' MP3 file libraries.2 31 Other functions
of the Napster service include a chat service and a
New Artist Program, allowing signed and un-
signed artists to create artistic profiles that Nap-
ster accepts only if those artists authorize sharing
of their music. 232 Napster is presently financed
solely by venture capital, and does not make any
revenue or profit."33 Napster eventually plans to
obtain revenue through advertising, commissions
from links to commercial websites, subscriber fees
and direct CD sales. 234
Napster is considered the fastest-growing
software application ever recorded by Internet re-
search companies. 235 Its user base quadrupled be-
tween February and July 2000.236 In June 2000,
there were approximately 600,000 MP3 files avail-
able for sharing. 237 Currently, as many as 10,000
music files are shared per second over Napster.238
The service is growing at 200% a month, and by
the end of 2000, there are projected to be 75 mil-
lion Napster users. 239 Approximately 87% of the
music available on Napster belongs to the RIAA
or other copyright holders. 240
3. The Parties' Initial Arguments in Napster
Napster contended that it met the definition of
"service provider" under the DMCA and satisfied
the five requirements for an exemption to the
DMCA found in Section 512(a) because: (1) Nap-
ster users, not Napster itself, initiate the transmis-
sion of MP3 files; (2) the transmission occurs au-
tomatically; (3) Napster does not choose any of
the recipients; (4) Napster does not copy any of
the material during transmission; and (5) the con-
228 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 760.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
232 Id. at 907.
233 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 761.
234 Id.
235 Peter Svensson, Off the Charts, ABCNEWS.COM, at http:
//more.abcnews.go.com/sections/ tech/ dailynews/ napster
000911.html (Sept. 11, 2000).
236 Id.
237 Berschadsky, supra note 35, at 761.
238 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 903.
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tent is not modified during transmission. 24 1 RIAA
argued that Subsection 512(n) of the DMCA re-
quired each of Napster's functions to be analyzed
independently of the others.2 42 When so analyzed,
all of Napster's stated functions did not fall within
the safe harbor found in Section 512(a). 24-" RIAA
also alleged that Napster did not meet the more
rigorous lack of actual knowledge standard under
Section 512(d). RIAA's principal argument was
that Napster did not perform the passive conduit
function required by DMCA Section 512(a).2 44
Lastly, RIAA argued that Napster did not meet the
general eligibility requirements of Section 512(i)
for exemption from DMCA's provisions because
Napster did not discipline copyright infringers
and only adopted a copyright compliance policy
after litigation began z. 2 45
4. Title II Safe Harbor Provision and the District
Court's Denial of Napster's Motion for Summary
Judgement
Judge Patel of the District Court for Northern
California found that Napster did not meet the re-
quirements of Section 512(a)'s safe harbor provi-
sion of the DMCA and Napster was not entitled to
summary judgement.246 The judge first reasoned
that Section 512(a) applied to ISPs "transmitting,
routing, or providing connections for, material
through a system" and that Napster does not per-
form a "passive conduit" function.2 47 Thus, the
files are not transmitted "through" the Napster
system. 248 Under the Napster system, MP3 files
are transmitted "from the Host user's hard drive
and Napster browser, through the Internet to the
recipient's Napster browser and hard drive. ' '2 49
The judge also noted that Napster stressed the
passivity of its role and expressly denied that "the
transmission of MP3 files ever passes through its
servers. ' 250 In addition, the court found that the
"routing" or "providing connections" was through
241 Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *4.
242 [d.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id. at *10.
247 Id. at *6 (finding legislative history of the DMCA ex-
plains that the word "conduit" means "through a system"); 17
U.S.C. § 512(a).
248 Copyrights: DMCA 's Liability Exemptions Don't Protect On-
line Music System From Infringement Suit, U.S. L. WK. DAILY EDI-
TION, May 25, 2000, at d6, available at http://pub.bna.com/
the Internet itself from the host to the requesting
user and not through the Napster server. 25' Nap-
ster "enables or facilitates the initiation of connec-
tions, but these connections do not pass through
the system within the meaning of [Section]
512(a). '"252 Napster thus failed to qualify for the
Section 512(a) safe harbor because it did not
transmit, route, or provide connections through
its system to hosts and individual users. The court
did not, however, rule on the applicability of Sec-
tion 512(d) because Napster did not raise it as a
ground for summary judgement.253 Lastly, be-
cause Napster never reasonably implemented a
policy of terminating repeat copyright infringers
and Napster's copyright compliance policy was
not timely, Napster did not meet the conditions of
eligibility for relief under Subsection 512(i) of the
DMCA.
2 5 4
5. Analysis of the District Court's Interpretation of
Title II of the DMCA
Judge Patel's analysis of the Napster case under
Title II of the DMCA was a question of first im-
pression. One of the potential flaws with Judge
Patel's opinion was her rigid application of Sec-
tion 512(a)'s definition of "through a system. '" 255
Although MP3 files never actually pass through
Napster's servers, information about a user's re-
quest for a particular recording and Napster's
subsequent facilitated response regarding host IP
addresses and availability of the material certainly
does pass through Napster. The judge also ac-
cused Napster users of sharing music with the en-
tire world but failed to recognize that Napster is
merely a one-to-one file-sharing system. 25 6 If Sec-
tion 512(a) does not apply to file-sharing services
like Napster, this narrow reading of the DMCA
could stifle other Internet ventures from using or
expanding on this revolutionary technology that
requires central data indexes to work. 25 ' Legiti-
ptcj/9905183.htm [hereinafter U.S. L. WK. DAILY EDITION].
249 Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *7.
250 Id.
251 Id. See generally U.S. L. WK. DAILY EDITION, supra note
248.
252 Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *8.
253 Id. at *6 n.6.
254 Id. at *9.
255 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
256 SeeJohn Heilemann, David Boies-The Wired Interview,
WIRED, Oct. 2000, at 255 [hereinafter Heilemann].
257 See, e.g., id. at 254.
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mate Internet companies need to be able to grow
unencumbered by the threat of copyright in-
fringement lawsuits.
Moreover, in her opinion, Judge Patel noted
that although a Section 512(d) claim was not
presented by Napster, they could not rely on it as
a safe harbor because Napster had "reason to
know" of the third party's copyright infringe-
ment.2 58 However, Section 512 (d) requires an "ac-
tual knowledge" or a "red flag" standard, which is
much more than a mere "reason to know."259 The
red flag standard is based on an ISP's subjective
awareness and "differs from previous standards,
under which a defendant may be liable for con-
tributory infringement if it knows or should have
known that material was infringing. [The Section
512 standard] is whether the service provider'de-
liberately proceeded in the face of blatant factors
of which it is aware." 260 Even if Napster had failed
to comply with the red flag standard, it is neces-
sary to use the proper standard in a precedent-
setting case like this one. Congress could not have
intended a mere knowledge standard to apply to
the DMCA because, if ISPs do not know that their
users are engaging in copyright infringement,
there would be no third-party ISP liability under
the Act.26 1
Lastly, the court found that Napster did not
meet the reasonably implemented policy standard
for repeat infringers required by DMCA Section
512(i)(1)(A) because Napster did not block the
IP addresses of infringing users. 262 However, this
is not a requirement anywhere in the DMCA.
2 6 3
Under Section 512(j), the only type of permissible
court injunction against a protected ISP is termi-
nation of the subscriber accounts "that are speci-
fied in the judge's] order."264 Napster also
claimed that, as of October 2000, it had termi-
nated hundreds of thousands of users under the
DMCA notification procedure.265 The opinion in
this case, like Reimerdes, seems sympathetic to en-
tertainment copyright holders and pessimistic
258 Brief of Ad Hoc Copyright Coalition, Commercial In-
ternet Exch., Computer & Communications Indus. Assn',
Info. Tech. Ass'n of Am., Netcoalition.com, U.S. Internet In-
dus. Ass'n, and U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting None of the Parties at 16, A & M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, 2000 WL 1055915 (9th Cir. July 28, 2000) (Nos.
00-16401 and 00-16403).
259 Id. at 17.
260 Id. (citing NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NiMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 12B.04[A] [1] at 12B-35 (2000)).
261 Heilemann, supra note 256, at 256 (discussing the
about the future of file-sharing technology in that
the judges in both cases failed to consider lawful
aspects of the technology. On appeal, Title II will
hopefully be analyzed with more emphasis on the
prospective legitimate uses of peer-to-peer file
swapping on the Internet like Napster's technol-
ogy.
V. THE DISTRICT COURT'S PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AGAINST NAPSTER
A. Napster's Second Round of Arguments
In opposition to the RIAA's requests to enjoin
Napster at least temporarily from copyright in-
fringing activities, Napster asserted the fair use af-
firmative defense.2 66 Napster argued that the pre-
liminary injunction would impose a prior restraint
on speech, violating its First Amendment rights
and those of Napster users and artists. 267 Napster
also asserted that RIAA members had misused
their copyrights and expanded their monopoly
beyond the permissible scope under the Copy-
right Act.268 Finally, Napster contended that the
RIAA members had waived their entitlement to
copyright protection because they accelerated the
proliferation of MP3 files over the Internet by
seeking business partners for their commercial
downloading ventures and development of music
players that encouraged unauthorized ripping.269
1. Fair Use and Staple Article of Commerce
Affirmative Defenses Rejected
In her opinion, Judge Patel found first that the
RIAA had established a prima facie case of direct
infringement by Napster users because "virtually
all Napster users engage in unauthorized
downloading or uploading of copyrighted mu-
sic." 270 Direct copyright infringement was a
threshold requirement in order for the RIAA to
prevail on liability for contributory or vicarious
Napster case and the arguments made).
262 Napster, 2000 WL 573136, at *9; 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(i)(1)(A).
263 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
264 17 U.S.C. § 512(j) (1)(A) (ii).
265 Heilemann, supra note 256, at 255.
266 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912.
267 Id. at 922.
268 Id. at 923.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 911.
2001]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
copyright infringement against Napster. Judge
Patel found next that Napster had minimal com-
mercially noninfringing uses.27' In applying the
four fair use factors in Section 107 of the Copy-
right Act, Judge Patel opined that the purpose
and character of the illegal use was not necessarily
commercial, or personal or private because files
are sent to anonymous requesting users free of
charge by Napster.272 The second factor cut
against Napster because the works transferred or
downloaded are creative in nature and constitute
entertainment.2 73 Thirdly, music files are gener-
ally copied in their entirety as opposed to only
portions of the works. Lastly, the effect on the po-
tential market for the works is harmful because
CD sales at colleges are reduced and because it
raises a barrier to RIAA's entry into the digital
music Internet market.2 74 Thus, the Napster sys-
tem could not be considered a fair use of plain-
tiffs copyrighted works.
The court also refused to draw an analogy be-
tween Napster users "sampling" MP3 files for the
purchase of CDs in the future with the fair use of
"time-shifting" found in Sony that allowed private,
noncommercial copying of free television broad-
casts using a VCR.275 The VCR purchasers in Sony
merely enjoyed taped broadcasts at home while "a
Napster user who downloads a copy of a song to
her hard drive may make that song available to
millions of other individuals even if she eventually
chooses to purchase the CD. So-called sampling
on Napster may quickly facilitate unauthorized
distribution at an exponential rate." 276 The court
similarly refused to accept the proposition that
Sony "time-shifting" applied to "space-shifting," or
converting a purchased CD into MP3 format in
order to make it a more portable form of me-
dia.2 77 Even if this were considered a fair use,
"space-shifting" would not be "substantial enough
to preclude liability under the staple article of
271 Id. at 912.
272 Id.; see fair use factors, supra note 113; 17 U.S.C.
§ 107.
273 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
274 Id,
275 Id,; see also Copyrights: District Court Explains Copyright
Rulings Supporting Last Month's Napster Injunction, U.S. L. WK.
EDITION, at d4, available at http://pub.bna.com/lw/
995183.htm (Aug. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Napster Injunction].
276 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913.
277 Id.
278 Id.; Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079 (holding
Rio MP3 Player, which copies MP3 files from computer hard
drives in order to make them portable-called "space-shift-
commerce doctrine. '2 78 In refusing to apply that
doctrine, the court noted that in Sony the defen-
dant's only participation included manufacturing
and selling VCRs.2 79 In comparison, Napster
"maintains and supervises an integrated system
that users must access to upload or download
files," thereby controlling and facilitating the un-
authorized file sharing. 280 Finally, although Nap-
ster's New Artist Program and chat room services
were considered by both the court and RIAA to be
a fair use, they did not represent a commercially
significant aspect of Napster 2 8 1
2. Contributory and Vicarious Copyright
Infringement by Napster
The court noted that once the RIAA plaintiffs
showed direct copyright infringement by Napster
users, in order to prevail on the preliminary in-
junction, they also must show a likelihood of suc-
cess on the contributory copyright infringement
claim against Napster.282 On this issue, Judge
Patel found that Napster had reason to know of
their users' direct copyright infringement based
on a document written by a Napster co-founder
who acknowledged the need to remain ignorant
of users' real names and IP addresses because
"they are exchanging pirated music. '28 3 Napster
also received actual notice of direct infringement
from RIAA, who informed them of over 12,000 in-
fringing files.2 8 4 Napster relied on Religious Tech-
nology Center v. Netcom Online Communication Ser-
vices, Inc.2 8 5 in contending that titles in Napster's
file indexes could not distinguish infringing from
noninfringing files, and thus, Napster never knew
about copyright infringement engaged in by par-
ticular users. 28 6 The court rejected this argument,
concluding that actual knowledge of specific acts
of users' copyright infringement was not re-
quired.28 7 Unlike the bulletin board service oper-
ing"-was a fair use).
279 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916.
280 Id. at 917.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 918.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
286 Id. (holding where a bulletin board service operator
can not reasonably verify a claim of infringement, the opera-
tor's lack of knowledge will not expose her to liability for
contributory infringement).
287 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918.
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ator in Netcom, Napster is not an ISP that acts as a
mere conduit for the transfer of files.28 8 Finally,
the court found that Napster materially contrib-
uted to the copyright infringing activity by supply-
ing the "proprietary software, search engines,
servers, and means of establishing a connection
between users' computers."289
As to the vicarious copyright infringement
claim made by the RIAA, the court found that be-
cause Napster maintained that they attempted
continually to improve methods for blocking re-
peat infringers, Napster had basically admitted
that the company had the ability to supervise and
police the infringing activity. 290 Napster also was
found to have a direct financial interest in the
copyright infringing activity because it disclosed
future plans to "monetize" its user base even
though Napster currently receives no revenue. 29 a
In conclusion, the court found that RIAA had a
reasonable likelihood of success on both its con-
tributory and vicarious infringement claims
against Napster.292
3. The Rejection of Napster's First Amendment
Challenge, Misuse of Copyright Defense and
Waiver
Napster argued that the First Amendment af-
forded protection for its file directories. 293 Be-
cause Napster offers an electronic directory that
does not actually contain copyrighted material,
the preliminary injunction would impose a prior
restraint on Napster users' free speech.2 9 4 The
court rejected this argument, finding that the
First Amendment is coextensive with the fair use
doctrine.2 95 The court also held that RIAA mem-
bers did not seek to enjoin any of Napster's fair
uses, and that Napster could separate the infring-
ing and noninfringing parts of its services in order
to avoid a complete shut down. 29 6 Judge Patel fur-
288 Id.
289 Id. at 919-20 (analogizing Napster to the contribu-
tory liability of the swap meet operators selling musical re-
cordings in Fonovisa who provided parking, booth space, ad-
vertising and clientele).
290 Id. at 920-21.
291 Id. at 921; see also Napster Injunction, supra note 275, at
d4.
292 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 920-22.
293 Id. at 922.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 922-23.
297 Id. at 923.
ther rejected Napster's misuse of copyright de-
fense because although Napster cited cases deal-
ing with enlarging copyright monopolies through
licensing, RIAA members never granted Napster a
license to the music files being distributed over its
network.29 7 Lastly, Napster's argument that RIAA
had waived an entitlement to copyright protec-
tion was rejected because the court found that
RIAA did not invite "wholesale infringement
when they distributed a small number of free MP3
files for promotional purposes." 298
4. The District Court's Conclusions in Napster
The court found that, because the RLAA
showed "a reasonable likelihood of success on the
merits of their contributory and vicarious copy-
right infringement claims" against Napster, they
were entitled to a presumption of irreparable
harm. 299 Furthermore, predictions about a pre-
liminary injunction's impact on Napster was pure
speculation in comparison to the massive amount
of unauthorized use of RIAA's copyrighted works
by allowing Napster to continue its operations. 300
The court thus enjoined Napster from facilitating
others in the free copying of both plaintiffs' copy-
righted works in this suit and those not yet
named. 30'
B. Analysis of the District Court's Decision to
Enjoin Napster's Operation
Judge Patel's decision "disregarded the Su-
preme Court's caution that the judiciary should
be reluctant to expand copyright protections with-
out explicit legislative guidance when major tech-
nological innovations alter the market for copy-
righted materials."30 2 Such a decision threatens
manufacturers of digital technology and discour-
ages the development and use of new kinds of In-
298 Id. at 923-24.
299 Id. at 925.
o300 Id. at 926.
301 Id. at 927.
302 Brief for the Consumer Elec. Ass'n, The Digital Fu-
ture Coalition, and the Computer and Communications In-
dus. Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal at 3, Nap-
ster, Inc. v. A & M Records, Inc., 2000 WL 1055915 (9th Cir.
July 28, 2000) (Nos. 00-16401 and 00-16403) [hereinafter
Brief for Appellant]; Sony, 464 U.S. at 431 (holding that
"[s]ound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent
deference to Congress when major technological innovations
alter the market for copyrighted materials").
2001]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
ternet technology.113 However, the primary flaw
in this opinion is that the judge unconstitutionally
expanded the copyright holders' monopoly over
their copyrighted works, giving them control over
something they do not directly control.11 4 First,
Judge Patel misapplied the staple article of com-
merce doctrine from Sony because she assumed
that if a technology is primarily used for copyright
infringement, none of the other uses could be
considered commercially significant.30 5 Under
Sony, the technology "need merely be capable of
substantial noninfringing uses," and a court then
must consider both actual current uses and all the
future "different potential uses" of the technol-
ogy, not simply current actions by users of the
technology. 3 16 Regardless of the other Napster
uses, such as sampling and time-shifting, the court
held that "Napster's primary role of facilitating
the unauthorized copying and distribution [of]
established artists' songs renders Sony inapplica-
ble."30 7 The court further disregarded the Ninth
Circuit's holding in Diamond Multimedia that the
AHRA protects the home taping of "all noncom-
mercial copying by consumers of digital and ana-
log musical recordings," not merely certain types
of noncommercial reproductions.308
Next, Judge Patel found that the sharing of mu-
sic where artists have authorized copying and dis-
tribution. of their works through Napster "may not
represent a substantial or commercially significant
aspect of Napster" because it was not a key aspect
of Napster's initial business plan.30 9 However, the
Sony standard was meant to be a forward-looking
flexible test, considering all of the many potential
uses of the technology in order to allow it to "ma-
ture and realize future lawful uses."310 In Sony, the
Supreme Court found that the VCR met the "ca-
pable of substantial noninfringing use" standard
because: "(a) consumers could record program-
ming that either was not copyrighted or whose
owners did not object to the recording; and (b)
unauthorized time-shift recording for subsequent
viewing was fair use."3 1' Yet, the Sony Court found
303 Brief for Appellant, supra note 302, at 3.
304 Heilemann, supra note 256, at 256.
305 Id. at 255; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
306 Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (emphasis added).
307 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 917.
308 Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1079 (emphasis ad-
ded).
309 Napster, 114 F. SIpp. 2d at 917.
310 Brief for Appellant, supra note 302, at 8.
that only 7.3% of the programming was consid-
ered nonobjectionable, or authorized by copy-
right holders.3 12 Thus, imposing contributory lia-
bility on Napster would be unfair to those who
appreciated time-shifting as a means to enlarge
the audience for their works.313 Whereas, in Nap-
ster, the court found that 87% of the works on
Napster are copyrighted, while 13% are not.3 14
The court in Napster disregarded the fact that the
authorized copying and distribution of an artists'
works as a way to expand one's audience may be
substantial fair uses of these works and are far
from insignificant.
Third, the court in Napster found that Sony was
different because Napster "exercises continuing
control over its service[,]" but that was not a re-
quirement to be proved under the Sony fair use
doctrine.3 1 5 The Napster court, on the other hand,
found that Napster never exercised control over
the selection and transmission of files by its
users.316 The court also held that Napster could
avoid copyright liability if it modified its service to
avoid the possibility of infringement, another as-
pect of copyright doctrine not required under
Sony.3"17 The court in Napster applied the staple ar-
ticle of commerce doctrine more strictly than the
Sony Court intended and Judge Patel refused to
accept the instruction that courts "be circumspect
in construing the scope of rights created by a leg-
islative enactment which never contemplated
such a calculus of interests. '"3 18 In essence, Judge
Patel's opinion in Napster discourages innovation
by Internet companies who fear copyright litiga-
tion might shut them down.
C. Finding a Solution for Napster in the
Online Copyright Debate Over the
Distribution of Digital Entertainment
Content
For years, it has generally been opined that re-
cord companies charge inflated prices for their
products, with most of the revenue ending up in
"I Id. at 9-10.
S12 Sony, 464 U.S. at 424.
" 13 Brief for Appellant, supra note 302, at 10.
314 Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902-03.
4' Id. at 916.
316 Id. at 907.
317 Id. at 915-16.
3418 Sony, 464 U.S. at 431.
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the hands of corporate executives, as opposed to
the very artists who create the copyrighted
works.3 19 Record companies, as the middlemen,
have retained control over the distribution of
these works as a type of weapon against their art-
ists. The Internet threatens this balance of con-
trol. The recording industry holds stubbornly to
the retailing model where people are actually
purchasing CDs when, in reality, people are now
downloading MP3s. Physical promotion and dis-
tribution of music has essentially "peaked in eco-
nomic terms."320 Both the Reimerdes and Napster
opinions reflect this point by masking what the
judges believe protects copyright holders, while
they are actually sustaining an outdated industry
model in which the record and film executives,
not the artists, are the main profiteers. 321
As the lines continue to blur between various
media of communications in the digital age, the
recording industry would be smart to try to learn
from and work with the Napster distribution
model. Online music distribution has proven to
be a more efficient means of delivery to consum-
ers, something that the record companies should
be attempting to promote and not destroy.322
This is because online distribution gives artists the
chance to reach their audiences directly while re-
cording industry companies have an opportunity
to reduce their marginal costs of distribution to
almost zero.32 3 An alternative to the extreme sanc-
tions imposed against Napster might be
319 Martin Peers, States Sue Record Firms Over CD Pricing
Policies, WALL ST.J., Aug. 9, 2000, at B7. On Aug. 8, 2000, the
Attorneys General from 30 states and commonwealths filed a
federal lawsuit against five record companies and three retail
music chains for allegedly conspiring to fix prices of CDs,
costing consumers hundreds of millions of dollars. Under a
minimum advertised price ("MAP") policy established by re-
cord companies in the mid-1990s to end CD price wars, dis-
count retailers were forced to charge a fixed price for CDs or
lose millions of dollars from promotional payments from re-
cord companies. In May, the Federal Trade Commission set-
tled with five of the major record labels who agreed to stop
MAP policies for seven years, without having to admit wrong-
doing. Id.
320 Hearings, supra note 17 (testimony of Gene Hoffman,
Jr., Founder, President and CEO, EMusic.com, Inc.).
321 Editorial, Overkill on MP3, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10,
2000, at F6 [hereinafter Overkill on MP3],; Voegtli, supra note
89, at 1241 ("[lIt is not uncommon for the total earnings
from derivative works to exceed movie ticket sales, and com-
panies, like the Walt Disney Company, have successfully ex-
ploited derivative rights to generate considerable profits.").
322 Hearings, supra note 17 (testimony of Gene Kan,
Gnutella, Developer and Founder, Infrasearch, Inc.).
323 Id. (discussing the reasons artists and recording com-
"recogniz [ing] the popularity of listening to mu-
sic [online] while acknowledging the property
rights of the recording industry."324 RLAA mem-
bers would be better ceasing this seemingly end-
less litigation that will continue against other simi-
lar online ventures if a court order shuts down
Napster.
The recurring theme throughout the Napster
case is that even if Napster is shut down, there will
always be other music trading services ready to
take their place and they will be just as difficult to
police. 3 25 Although companies like Scour.com, "a
Napster-like Windows program" that is a kind of
"easy-to-use AOL for filesharing," has laid off most
of its staff due to legal threats by the RLAA, there
are other similar, but decentralized and anony-
mous services like Gnutella and Freenet that will
be harder for the RLAA to sue. 326 Gnutella will
most likely be the first program people download
if Napster is shut down. 327 With Gnutella, once
someone downloads the software, "a 'hello' mes-
sage is sent to a computer that is already on the
network, which forwards it to seven others, letting
them know that the first computer is on board...
[t] hey in turn, forward it to six more, which for-
ward it to five more and so on."328 A particular
request percolates through the Gnutella network
and when it reaches a computer that has the file,
the message percolates back to the initial request-
ing computer, making the original person who re-
panies can benefit from digital music); Gaffney, supra note
12, at 629 ("[T]he combination of low-cost perfect copying
with electronic distributive networks such as the Internet al-
lows for widespread dissemination of high-quality copies at
very low overhead costs.").
324 Overkill on MP3, supra note 321.
325 See Heilemann, supra note 256, at 258 (discussing the
inevitability of other online peer-to-peer file-sharing service).
Napster also has demonstrated that if the file-sharing central
index technology were located offshore in another country,
the United States would not have the power to stop the Nap-
ster-like services from emerging. Id.
326 New DivX is the MP3 of Movie Swapping: But Expects
Frustrations-The Revolution Is Still in Early Beta, TIME DIGITAL,
at http://www.time.com/time/digital/daily/0,2882,5281 1,
00.html (Aug. 17, 2000); see alsoJanelle Brown, The Gnutella
Paradox, RED HERRING COMM., at http://www.redherring.
com/insider/2000/1002/tech-off-salon-gnutella100200-
home.html (Oct. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Brown] (discussing
the popularity of Gnutella on the Internet and Gnutella's fu-
ture legal situation if Napster is shut down).
327 Brown, supra note 326.
328 Karl Taro, Meet the Napster, TIME DIGITAL, at http://
www.time.com.time/magazine/articles/0,3266,55730-
5,00.html (Oct. 2, 2000).
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quested the file essentially anonymous. 329 The
problem with Gnutella is that in order to get onto
the network there needs to be other users, and in
order to find a particular file there needs to be a
significant number of users on board.330 Further-
more, because there is no central server, there is
no technical support or hotline to give technical
assistance to its users. 33 1 Lastly, the software is a
"work-in-progress" and is still flawed. 33 2 However,
it will be difficult for the RIAA to bring legal ac-
tion against Gnutella because it is not restricted to
MP3 file sharing. - 4 Gnutella also has no central
server and because Gnutella is merely a protocol,
there is no one entity responsible for its existence
on the Internet and thus, no company to sue.33 4
Regardless, RIAA members are hinting that they
are strategizing a legal attack on Gnutella 33 5
The best example of a compromise between the
RIAA and companies that are in the gray areas of
copyright law like Napster, MP3.com and
Gnutella, is EMusic.com. 336 EMusic.com offers
the Internet's largest catalog of downloadable
MP3 music available for purchase, offering over
100,000 MP3s by signed artists.3 3 7 Through licens-
ing agreements and relationships with artists,
EMusic.com sells individual tracks for ninety-nine
cents and entire downloadable albums for
$8.99. 3 3 The most attractive part of the technol-
ogy is the "EMusic Unlimited" subscription service
that offers unlimited MP3s for download at $9.99
per month for a full year or $19.99 for one
month. 339 Thus, under the EMusic.com model,
artists are still paid royalties while consumers are
offered reasonable download prices for music
they enjoy.3 40 The EMusic.com model drives con-
sumers to feel less cheated and more willing to
pay. This rational solution to consumer demand
would effectively put a stop to the RLAA's lock and
key mentality to its music.
Recognizing the benefits of the EMusic.com
329 Id.
330 Id. (discussing the problems with Gnutella).
331 Id.
332 Id.
3 See generally What is Gnutella?, at http://www.gnutel-
lanews.com/information/what-isgnutella.shtml (last visited
Jan. 10, 2001) (describing how the Gnutella service and
software work).
334 Id.
335 Brown, supra note 326.
336 See generally EMusic.com, at http://www.emusic.com
(last modified Oct. 20, 2000).
337 Hearings, supra note 17 (testimony of Gene Hoffman,
Jr., Founder, President and CEO, EMusic.com, Inc.).
model, on October 31, 2000, Bertelsmann AG,
the parent company of RIAA member BMG En-
tertainment and the fourth-largest music com-
pany in the U.S., struck a deal with Napster to de-
velop a new subscription-based distribution
service in exchange for an undisclosed investment
in Napster.341 Under the alliance, BMG will with-
draw from the RIAA copyright infringement law-
suit against Napster "once the service has recon-
figured itself to pay royalties to Bertelsmann's
artists through pay-for-play subscription fees" at
approximately $4.95 a month.342 However, the
terms of the agreement are unclear, including
how the company plans on monitoring the songs-
users' downloads and how revenue will be shared
with other labels that decide to join.343 The deal
also came as a surprise to Sony, Universal, Warner
and EMI, the four other major RLAA companies,
and it is far from certain that they will commit to
the endeavor.344 Finally, the Napster-Bertelsmann
deal will not end the lawsuit filed by the RIAA
against Napster and depending on the outcome
of the appeal, the new partnership could be extin-
guished if Napster is ordered to shut down.3 45
V. CONCLUSION
Although the entertainment industry seems to
be winning the initial battles in the war against
the unauthorized copying and distribution of
copyrighted digital music and video over the In-
ternet, their resistance to technological change
may end up costing them the war. These early vic-
tories that strengthen the law in favor of copyright
holders should be seen as a temporary restraining
wall until the entertainment industry accepts the
new realities of technology and adjusts the way
they distribute digitally copyrighted works. Al-
though the Reimerdes case may be upheld on ap-
peal for public policy reasons, the proliferation
338 Id.
339 See generally EMusic Unlimited, at http://
www.emusic.com/subscription/index.html (last modified
Nov. 18, 2000).
340 Hearings, supra note 17 (testimony of Gene Hoffman,
Jr., Founder, President and CEO, EMusic.com, Inc.).
341 David Segal, Napster and Former Foe Plan Online Song
Sales; BerteLsmann to Quit Industry Lawsuit, TilE WASHINGTON
POST, Nov. 1, 2000, at Al.
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 [d.
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with which DeCSS has flourished over the In-
ternet makes the decision somewhat infeasible in
reality. Even if 2600.com is banned from posting
or linking to DeCSS on its particular website,
DeCSS will continue to exist all over the Internet.
Although Napster's future does not look promis-
ing and Napster may soon be shut down by court
order, the legitimacy of certain uses for online file
swapping might still be upheld. However, even if
Napster is shut down, its progeny are right behind
them, ready to take Napster's place. Those web-
sites may be hard to find, police and subsequently
difficult to sue. While the MPAA is looking for
better encryption technology and the RIAA is try-
ing to establish its own encryption technology in
order to remain competitive, these industry
groups should focus on taking advantage of the
new business opportunities of digital distribution
over the Internet. The more industry continues to
lock up copyrights and expand monopolies over
their copyrighted works, the more consumers will
fight back by using online distribution outlets like
Napster. In the end, it is up to the entertainment
industry to decide whether or not they want to
work with such new technologies that are em-
braced by the American public. If they don't find
a resolution soon or work toward furthering these
innovative technologies, the Shawn Fannings and
Jon Johansens of this world will take control of
the Internet and essentially make copyright laws
moot.
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